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How Does Color Experience Represent the World? 
 
 




There is no call to treat illusory sensible qualities, and in particular colours, as actual 
qualities of actual entities.  
 
David Armstrong (1984) 
 
Many favor representationalism about color experience. To a first approxima-
tion, this view holds that experiencing is like believing. In particular, like be-
lieving, experiencing is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way.  
Once you view color experience along these lines, you face a big question: 
do our color experiences represent the world as it really is? For instance, sup-
pose you see a tomato. Representationalists claim that having an experience 
with this sensory character is necessarily connected with representing a dis-
tinctive quality as pervading a round area out there in external space. Let us 
call it “sensible redness” to highlight the fact that the representation of this 
property is necessarily connected with the sensory character of the experience. 
Is this property, sensible redness, really co-instantiated with roundness out 
there in the space before you?1   
Since the development of the new mathematical physics of 17th century, 
many prominent thinkers have returned a negative answer. Galileo, for in-
stance, famously said that “tastes, odors, colors, and so on reside in conscious-
ness”, not the external world. Following this tradition, some contemporary 
representationalists hold that tomatoes and other objects are just collections of 
particles and fields lacking sensible properties. We evolved to have experiences 
that habitually misrepresent objects in space as having various sensible colors, 
only because this helps us to discriminate them from one another.    
However, other representationalists resist this radical irrealist view. They 
think representationalism about color experience goes best with “realism” 
about sensible colors. The tomato’s surface really does exemplify sensible red-
ness. In general, our color experiences typically represent objects as they really 
are.  
We will look at these different versions of representationalism. But first I 
will explain in more detail the basic representationalist approach they share.  
 																																																								
1 A note on terminology: Most representationalists, for instance Byrne and Hilbert (2003) and 
Tye (2000), think that ordinary color terms in English like “the color red”, or “redness”, or 
“that color” refer to what I’m calling “sensible redness”. If they are right (and I think that they 
are), then we could drop the cumbersome term “sensible redness” and simply use “redness”. But 
other representationalists, for instance Shoemaker (1994) and Chalmers (2010, essay 12), deny 
that ordinary color terms to refer to this property. So, to refer to this property, they invent spe-
cial technical terms, like “phenomenal redness” (Shoemaker), or “perfect redness” (Chalmers). 
We all have the same property in mind; we just use different terms to refer to it. To stay neutral 
on this terminological disagreement, I have decided to introduce the neutral term “sensible red-
ness” to refer to this property.   
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I. Representationalism about Color Experience: The Basic Idea 
 
To understand representationalism, it is best to start with non-veridical color 
experience. Suppose that someone – call her “Mary” – suffers from “Charles 
Bonnet syndrome”, a condition which involves having vivid hallucinations. 
Suppose in particular that she hallucinates a tomato. Intuitively, having this 
phenomenal experience is essentially connected with having an experience as 
of a reddish and round item in a certain location. But, in this case, no physical 
round and reddish thing is present. So how come it is correct to say Mary has 
an experience as of a reddish and round item?    
Before representationalism became popular, the dominant view was the 
sense datum theory. On this approach, what Mary experiences is a non-physical 
round and reddish item created by her brain – a “sense datum” or “mental im-
age”. In general, sensible colors do not qualify ordinary physical objects, but 
such mental images of them created by the brain. However, this view faces 
well-known puzzles.2  
Enter the representationalist alternative. On representationalism, all that is 
going on is that Mary’s experience “represents” that there is something before 
her with the properties being round and reddish. This doesn’t require that there 
really is an item – a peculiar mental “sense datum” – that has these properties. 
On representationalism, Mary’s hallucination is like a belief in that it is a “rep-
resentational” state that can represent properties belonging to no real (physical 
or mental) thing.  
But, of course, Mary’s hallucinatory experience is a representational state 
of a kind very different from belief. Hallucination, unlike mere belief, involves 
a vivid impression of the real presence of a thing. To explain this, representation-
alists would claim that, in having her hallucination, Mary stands in a very 
unique representational relation to the properties being round and being reddish, 
even though those properties are not presently instantiated before her. I will 
call it the “perceptual representation relation”. This hypothesized relation is 
unique in that, when one bears it to some properties, one has the vivid impres-
sion that there is an object present with those properties. Indeed, on a simple 
form of representationalism, Mary’s having her tomato-like hallucination is just 
identical with her perceptually representing (or “perceptually predicating”) a 
cluster of tomato-like properties such as being reddish and being roundish (where 
these properties can exist even if they aren’t instantiated by any real thing). 
Representationalists, then, do not appeal “sensations”, or “qualia”, that are dis-
tinct from and lie behind perceptually representing the world to be a certain 
way (pace Campbell, this volume); rather, they say that experiencing is nothing 
but representing.  
In general, most representationalists hold that, necessarily, if two individu-
als have phenomenally different visual experiences, then they perceptually rep-
resent different clusters of sensible properties. Other representationalists ad-
vocate weaker versions of representationalism that allow for some exceptions 
to this general principle (e. g. cases where you perceptually represent the same 
properties but there is a change in which ones you attend to).  																																																								
2 However, the sense datum theory of color experience has recently been defended by Brown 
(2010) and Robinson (1994, 59–74), among others.   
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Representationalism about color experience has many virtues. It accom-
modates the undeniable fact that, necessarily, in having standard visual experi-
ences, it seems that sensible colors are co-instantiated with certain shapes and 
location properties. For instance, necessarily, if one has a tomato-like experi-
ence, then one has an experience that matches the world only if a reddish, 
round item is present at a certain place. It also explains how both veridical and 
non-veridical experience can provide a subject with the capacity to think about 
and learn truths about sensible colors and shapes, even when they aren’t in-
stantiated by physical objects before the subject (Russell 1912, chap. X; John-
ston 2004, 130; Tye 2014, 51-2). At the same time, it avoids the “sense data” of 
traditional sense datum theory.  
For the sake of discussion, let us assume that representationalism is right.  
This view implies that every sensory experience has two elements: (i) the per-
ceptual representation relation, and (ii) a complex of sensible properties that are 
the relata of this relation (sensible colors, shapes, audible properties, and so 
on).3 So once we accept representationalism, we face a pair of difficult ques-
tions. For color experience, they are as follows.  
First, the sensible colors question: what is the nature of the “sensible colors”. 
For instance, what is the nature of the “sensible redness” which Mary percep-
tually represents as co-instantiated with roundness? Is it a property that toma-
toes and other objects sometimes really have?   
Second, there is the representation relation question. What is the nature of 
“the perceptual representation relation” that we bear to sensible redness and 
other perceptible properties? For instance, when Mary hallucinates a tomato, 
she bears this relation to being reddish and being round. How does Mary’s brain 
enable her to “reach out” and perceptually represent these properties, so that 
they seem present before her, even though they are not really present before 
her? Is this “perceptual representation relation” a spooky non-physical relation 
between her mind and these sensible properties? Or can it be identified with 
some kind of unproblematic physical relation (e. g. the kind of “tracking rela-
tion” we’ll discuss in the next section)? As Mark Johnston has observed (2011, 
215-216), a central puzzle about the mind is how to “explain the relation of 
sensory intentionality”. 
Let us now to turn to different versions of representationalism about color 
experience. They differ in how they answer these twin questions.  
 
2. Response-Independent Representationalism 
 
I will explain response-independent representationalism by way of a simple argu-
ment for it based on considerations of uniformity. The argument starts with an 
account of our experience of shape, and then generalizes that account to the 
experience of color.4 																																																								
3 Here and in what follows, I work with the simple property-complex formulation of representa-
tionalism. See Chalmers (2012, 343), Bealer (1982, 235-239), Dretske (1995, 101-2), McGinn 
(1999, 319-23), Tye (2014). On another formulation, representationalism is the view that having 
an experience consists in standing in a special relation (the “perceptual entertaining relation”) to 
a complete proposition attributing sensible properties to things.   
4 Armstrong (1987, 36) and Byrne and Hilbert (2003, 7) stress the desirability of a uniform ac-
count of color and shape. The point to be developed is that it is desirable to have a uniform an-
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Above we supposed that Mary has a hallucination of a tomato. Let’s now 
suppose that she has an ordinary, non-hallucinatory experience of one. Let’s 
start with the question: how does Mary perceptually represent the shape, being 
round? This is the “representation relation question” concerning shape.   
Most philosophers are realists about space as we perceive it: they think that 
the shapes we perceptually represent are real properties of objects that are de-
tected by our visual systems (but see footnote 26 for dissent). So the simplest 
answer would seem to be that Mary perceptually represents this property in 
much the same way that a thermometer represents a temperature. Very rough-
ly: she perceptually represents the property of being round by virtue of under-
going an internal state (namely, a neural pattern) that, under biologically nor-
mal conditions, is typically caused by (“tracks”) the instantiation of that shape 
in the environment. (Likewise for more primitive spatial features, like edges 
and angles.) This is a simple version of what we might call the “tracking” theo-
ry of how we perceptually represent shape. 
Once we accept this “tracking” model of how Mary perceptually represents 
roundness, considerations of uniformity suggest using that same model to ex-
plain how she perceptually represents the reddish quality that seems to her to 
be co-instantiated with roundness. On such a uniform view, sensible redness, 
like roundness, is a real, objective property of the tomato that our visual sys-
tem causally detects or tracks. What could this property be? Our visual system 
tracks reflectance properties: that is, dispositions to reflect certain amounts of incident 
light across the visible spectrum. Objects that have different colors will have dif-
ferent reflectances (see Figure 1 below). So if we say that sensible redness just is 
a particular reflectance property of the tomato, the payoff is that we can then 
say that Mary perceptually represents this property in the same way she repre-
sents the property of being round.  
This view may seem immediately implausible because sensible colors seem 
to be non-dispositional, simple properties that you can’t define in other terms. 
But maybe this is just wrong. On the basis of ordinary experience, it doesn’t 
seem to us that water is H20. But that is what water is. Similarly, maybe sensi-
ble colors are in fact complex dispositional properties involving light, even if 
this is not visually evident.5  
This approach also applies to illusion and hallucination. For example, re-
turn to Mary’s tomato-like hallucination. How can she stand in the perceptual 
representation relation to the property being reddish (and also the property be-
ing round), even though it is not instantiated before her? What is it for this 
sensible property to be ostensibly present to her? On the tracking view, the an-
swer is that the property being reddish is just a reflectance property. And Mary 
stands in a tracking relation to this property, even though she is hallucinating 
and this property isn’t instantiated before her. Roughly, this consists her 
																																																																																																																																												
swer to the question of how we manage to represent color and shape (“the representation relation 
question”).   
5 Due to “metamerism”, the best view in the vicinity is that colors are extremely unnatural dis-
junctions or types of reflectances (Byrne and Hilbert 2003, Tye 2000). There is a serious problem 
about how we might “track” and represent such unnatural properties (Armstrong 1987, 42 and 
Byrne and Hilbert 2003b, 792). But, for the sake of simplicity, I will ignore this issue.  
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standing in this relation to it: she undergoes a neural pattern that is normally 
caused by its instantiation (when she sees the tomato, for instance).6 
This yields response-independent representationalism about color experience. 
It combines representationalism with the hypothesis that sensible colors are 
(like shapes) real properties objects that are totally independent of how we re-
spond to them.7  
Response-independent representationalism is externalist. On this view, the 
characters of your color experiences are not fixed by the intrinsic features of 
your neural processes. Rather, they are fixed by what reflectance properties 
those neural processes track in the extracranial world. For instance, Tye, a 
leading proponent, says that “[the brain] is not where phenomenal character is 
to be found” (1995, 162-3). Instead, his slogan is “phenomenal character is in 
the world” (2009, 119). So, for instance, the phenomenal character of your ex-
perience of red is not constituted by a neural pattern, but by a reflectance 
property (see Figure 1 below). 
Response-independent representationalism, in the version we are consider-
ing, is also reductive. It combines representationalism with a reductive physical-
ist approach to experience. It holds that sensible colors are identical with com-
plex physical properties (namely, reflectance properties) and the perceptual 
representation relation is identical with a complex physical relation between 
subjects and those complex physical properties (namely, a “tracking” relation). 
So it is attractively simple.8 
However, there are also arguments against response-independent repre-
sentationalism. Here we will look at two types of argument: the structural-
mismatch argument and arguments from variation.  
First, the structural-mismatch argument. To illustrate, suppose that some-
one – call him Maxwell - consecutively experiences a purple-looking grape, a 
blue looking ball, and finally a green-looking leaf. Now suppose Maxwell says, 
“blue resembles purple more than green”. This is an evident truth about the 
resemblance structure of the sensible colors. 
But it is a truth that response-independent representationalists apparently 
cannot accommodate. For the actual reflectance types typical of such objects 																																																								
6 More exactly, proponents of the tracking model identify the dyadic perceptual representation 
relation between individuals and sensible properties with a complex relation along the following 
lines: λxλy(x is in a internal state that is poised for cognitive access and that has the systemic 
biological function of tracking property y). See Dretske (1995,19-20), Tye (2000, 62), and Tye 
(2014, 51-2). This is a very simple sketch. Indeed, Byrne and Hilbert (2003) claim that all exist-
ing accounts are too simple. (MacPherson (2003) also raises a difficult puzzle about “novel col-
ors”.) However, I will use “tracking” generically to name whatever physical relation it is that we 
bear to reflectance properties which enables us to perceptually represent them, under the as-
sumption that colors are reflectance properties. In this generic sense, even Byrne and Hilbert 
hold that perceptual representation is a matter of “tracking”.  
7 David Armstrong (e. g. 1984) is originator of response-independent representationalism. More 
recent proponents of some form of this view include Byrne and Hilbert (2003), Dretske (1995), 
Hill (2009), Lycan (2001), Tye (2000).  
8 On one general formulation, “reductive physicalism” about some property or relation R (being 
reddish, being a city, etc.) is the view that R is identical with a complex property built up from the 
properties on some short list of “basic” physical properties and relations (e. g. the fundamental 
physical properties, together with various “topic-neutral” properties and relations such as causa-
tion and similarity). For different conceptions and defenses of reduction, see Lewis (1994), Jack-
son (1998, especially 62, 123), Sider (2011, chaps. 7 and 13), and Dorr (2008). 
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are shown in Figure 1 below. On response-independent representationalism, 
the sensible colors purple, blue and green just are these reflectance-types. So, 
on this view, Maxwell’s statement is true just in case the blue reflectance type (in 
the middle) resembles the purple reflectance type (on the left) more than the 
green reflectance type (on the right). But, somewhat surprisingly, this is appar-
ently not true. In fact, if anything, the blue reflectance type resembles the 
green reflectance type more than the purple reflectance type. So the identifica-
tion of the sensible colors with the corresponding reflectances types implies 
that Maxwell’s statement “blue resembles purple more than green” is false. In-
deed, it seems to imply that “blue resembles green more than purple” is true! 
Since these implications are incorrect, the fact of structural-mismatch shows 
that sensible colors must be distinct from the corresponding response-
independent reflectance types of objects.9 
          
 
 
                 Purple reflectance                     blue reflectance                      green reflectance 
   
                          Grape                                      ball                                            leaf 
 
Figure 1: Reflectances typical of purple, blue and green objects (from MacAdam 
1985). 
 
Why is there such a surprising mismatch between resemblances among the 
apparent colors of objects and the resemblances among those objects’ reflec-
tances? The answer seems to lie in our neural responses to those reflectances. 
For instance, even though the blue reflectance and the green reflectance are 
very similar, they lead to quite different neural responses in the brain, and this 
is why they lead to experiences of quite different sensible colors. This strongly 
suggests an alternative to response-independent representationalism. In par-
ticular, it suggests an account of sensible colors, and of their resemblances, in 
terms of our neural responses. We will return to these points later.  
Some response-independent representationalists have tried to answer the 
structural-mismatch argument. In particular, Byrne and Hilbert (2003) have 
tried to give a response-independent account of the truth of “blue resembles 																																																								
9 Philosophers who have put forward the structural-mismatch argument include Hardin (1988, 
66-67) and Thompson (1995, chap. 3). Scientists have long recognized the point when it comes 
to other sensible properties. For instance, Stevens et al. (1937) famously argued that perceived 
pitches cannot be identified with response-independent frequencies, on the grounds that the rela-
tions (in particular, equal intervals) among apparent pitches do not match those among frequen-
cies.   
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purple more than green” in terms of reflectances. First, they assert that there 
are four basic hue-magnitudes, namely, being reddish, being greenish, being yellow-
ish, and being bluish. They identify each of these four hue-magnitudes with a 
disjunction of reflectances (2003, 55). Thus, being bluish is just the disjunction 
of reflectances possessed by bluish objects (e. g. blue objects, purple objects, 
etc.). Then they say that the truth of “blue resembles purple more than green” 
amounts to the following: the blue reflectance-type and the purple reflectance-
type, but not the green reflectance-type, imply a common hue-type (in this case, 
being bluish), that is, belong to one of the aforementioned disjunctions of re-
flectances. In short, they hold that when we say “blue resembles purple more 
than green”, what we are saying is true just in case the relevant reflectance-
types stand in the hue-difference relation, that is, the relation x and y, but not z, 
imply belonging to a common hue-type (that is, imply having one of the aforemen-
tioned disjunctions of reflectances).  
Byrne and Hilbert’s response to the structural-mismatch argument faces 
several problems of detail.10 However, here we will focus on one general worry 
about their discussion. Although we are focusing on sensible colors, it is im-
portant to realize that the structural-mismatch argument poses a general prob-
lem for response-independent representationalists. Therefore, to answer the 
argument, it is not enough to focus just on the case of sensible colors, as Byrne 
and Hilbert do.  
Let’s look at the experience of smell. Byrne and Hilbert (2003, 59) note 
that, because we expect a uniform account of different sensible properties, re-																																																								
10 Here are three main problems of detail facing Byrne and Hilbert’s hue-magnitude proposal. 
(1) Byrne and Hilbert give no response-independent account of truths involving degree such as: 
the degrees bluishness and reddishness in the ball are roughly equal (so that the ball roughly equally re-
sembles a pure blue object and a pure red object). Intuitively, this is not a truth about numbers, any 
more than the height of the rectangle is equal to (or double, etc.) to its width is about numbers. But if 
degrees of hue-magnitudes are not numbers, then what are they, and what is it for them to be 
“equal”? Byrne and Hilbert (2003, 55) apparently hold that the degree of reddishness that the ball 
possesses is just a certain disjunction D1 of reflectances, namely the disjunction of the reflectances 
of all objects (all balanced blue-red objects, all balanced blue-green objects) that are bluish to 
this same degree. Likewise, they hold that the degree of bluishness that the ball possesses is just 
another disjunction D2 of reflectances. This implies that the degrees bluishness and reddishness in the 
ball are roughly equal iff D1 is roughly equal to D2. But if D1 and D2 are just distinct (but overlap-
ping) disjunctions of reflectances, as Byrne and Hilbert claim, then what is it for D1 to be 
“roughly equal to” D2? (2) Byrne and Hilbert also give no response-independent theory of de-
grees of brightness. One idea would be to equate brightness with physical luminance. But this 
idea fails. At equiluminance, reds are brighter than greens (Corney et al. 2009). Indeed, a yellow 
patch might be brighter than a white patch, even if the yellow patch has lower luminance (Con-
way 2013, 11). So how would Byrne and Hilbert analyze “color x is brighter than color y” in 
response-independent terms, in particular, in terms of reflectances? (3) Finally, any adequate 
account must accommodate the truth of general claims of color resemblance such as “every color 
on the hue-circle resembles nearby colors more than farther away colors”. But Byrne and Hil-
bert’s hue-difference account of color resemblance is unable to accommodate the truth of such a 
general claim (Pautz 2011, p. 423-424, fn. 6). For instance, there are shades of purple P1, P2, 
and P3 on the hue-circle such that that P1 resembles P2 more than P3; but they certainly don’t 
satisfy the hue-difference relation as explained in the text. In response, Byrne and Hilbert might 
suggest that, for arbitrary colors x, y and z, x resembles y more than z iff there is some hue-
magnitude h such that the degree of h of x is more similar to the degree of h of y than the degree of 
h of z. (Here I’m indebted to Keith Allen.) But this too is open to counterexamples: for instance, 
let x = R60, Y40, y = R63, B37, and z = R70, Y30. For other problems with Byrne and Hilbert’s 
proposal, see Allen (2017, chap. 6).  
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sponse-independent representationalism about the experience of colors stands 
or falls with response-independent representationalism about the experience of 
other types of sensible properties. So if response-independent representation-
alism is right for the experience of color, you would expect a parallel account 
to apply to the experience of smell. On such an account, smell qualities (citrus, 
minty, etc.) are response-independent chemical types, and we perceptually 
represent them because our olfactory systems track them.  
However, the structural-mismatch argument against response-independent 
representationalism rears its head here as well. To illustrate, let’s take another 
example based on our actual resemblance judgments. Suppose that, after see-
ing objects with the reflectances shown in Figure 1, Maxwell consecutively 
smells the chemical types shown in Figure 2 below: 
 
 
           citrus2                                     citrus1                           minty 
 
Figure 2: From Margot (2009). 
 
As a matter of fact, even though the first two chemical types are very different, 
they produce very similar neural responses in us. They cause in us experiences 
of similar, but distinguishable, citrus-like qualities (Howard et al. 2009).  The 
third chemical type smells minty. So, Maxwell will judge “the middle smell 
(citrus1) resembles the first smell (citrus2) more than the third smell (minty)”. 
This statement is evidently true. But, again, response-independent representa-
tionalism seems to have the absurd implication that it is false. For, on this 
view, the smell qualities that Maxwell experiences just are the external response-
independent chemical types shown in Figure 2, which his olfactory system tracks. 
And the middle chemical type does not resemble the first chemical type more 
than the third – if anything, it resembles the third more than the first. Given 
the empirical facts, response-independent representationalism about smell just 
seems clearly wrong.  
Response-independent representationalists like Byrne and Hilbert haven’t 
responded to the structural-mismatch argument in the case of smell resem-
blance. Nothing like their “hue-difference” account applies here. As is well-
known, there simply are no privileged “basic smell categories” in the way that 
Byrne and Hilbert think that there are four basic hue categories.  
Here is another element of the structural-mismatch problem for response-
independent representationalists. To illustrate, suppose that we encounter an 
island where all humans lack the experience of chromatic colors – they only 
experience black-white-grey – and also lack the sense of smell. Still, because 
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they do experience many other qualities (achromatic colors, taste qualities, au-
dible qualities), they can acquire a general, topic-neutral concept of compara-
tive resemblance among qualities, “quality x resembles quality y more than 
quality z”. Now, suppose that we tell one of the islanders – call him “Larry” - 
about the colors and smell qualities I’ve discussed above, which are unlike any 
qualities he’s experienced. And suppose we ask him to just guess the resem-
blances of these qualities that he cannot experience. Employing his general 
concept of comparative resemblance among qualities, he makes the following 
guess:  
 
[#] Blue resembles purple more than green and the citrus1 smell 
resembles the citrus2 smell more than the minty smell.   
 
Intuitively, Larry’s guess is (determinately) true. Analogy: given a finite 
number of examples of arithmetical sums, Larry can acquire a general concept 
of plus, which he can then use to make true (or false) claims about new cases.  
However, response-independent representationalists cannot explain how 
Larry’s guess [#] could be determinately true. For, on this view, the qualities 
his guess is about are the reflectance-types and chemical properties represented in 
the figures above. So, on this view, Larry’s guess is true just in case the or-
dered-triple <the blue reflectance, the purple reflectance, the green reflec-
tance> and the ordered-triple <R-limonene, citral, R-carvone> both satisfy a 
general, topic-neutral relation of comparative resemblance that is expressed by 
his use of the resemblance-predicate in [#]. But how could Larry’s history on 
the island (his interaction with other physical properties) determine that his 
use of the resemblance predicate picks out a relation that is satisfied by both of 
these trios of disparate physical properties, physical properties he has never interacted 
with? The problem is not that there are no relations that are satisfied by these 
trios. Since relations are abundant, there are in fact infinitely many such rela-
tions; they are extremely disjunctive, unnatural relations, since they are instan-
tiated by trios of disparate physical properties. Rather, the problem is that 
there are also infinitely many relations defined over reflectances and chemical 
properties that are not satisfied by these trios. And since all these relations are equally 
unnatural and disjunctive, it’s very hard how Larry’s history on the island could have 
determined that his use of the resemblance predicate picks out a relation of the first sort 
rather than a relation of the second sort. (It is not the case that relations of the first 
sort are more “natural” than relations of the second sort, in the way that plus is 
more natural than quus, and therefore easier for Larry to refer to: see Lewis 
1983, pp. 375-376.) That is why, on response-independent representational-
ism, it’s hard to see how Larry’s guess [#] could be determinately true.11  
																																																								
11 The argument here is not that response-independent representationalists must show that the 
truth of Larry’s guess [#] can be deduced a priori from the response-independent character of 
the physical properties shown in Figures 1 and 2. In fact, they certainly should reject this a prior-
ity claim for standard reasons (see Davies 2014, 301-303). Rather, the argument is that, even if 
they do reject this a priority claim, they still must at least gesture at an a posteriori account of how 
Larry’s managed to make a true claim, rather than a false (or indeterminate) one. Compare: a 
type-type neural identity theorist for pain needs to gesture at an a posteriori account of truths like 
“my second pain was more intense than my first pain” in terms of neural firing rates or whatev-
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In the next section, we will see that alternative forms of representational-
ism avoid these problems concerning structural-mismatch. 
Let us now turn to a second type of argument against response-
independent representationalism: arguments from variation. We will consider a 
few different arguments of this kind.  
Consider first an argument from actual cases of variation. While we are tri-
chromats, some birds have a tetrachromatic color vision system that is sensitive 
to UV light. There is reason to think that, when a human and such a bird see a 
tomato, they experience different sensible colors. There is also variation among 
normal humans. For instance, the color chip might look pure blue to John and 
greenish blue to Jane, where John and Jane both have normal color vision. On 
representationalism, such variation means that different perceivers disagree 
concerning what sensible colors they perceptually represent objects as having. 
But if so, then it looks like they are stuck with saying that some perceivers are 
getting it right and the others are getting it wrong. But this kind of misrepre-
sentation is implausible. All the perceivers have equal claim to being veridical 
perceivers of color.  
However, this argument is unpersuasive. Response-independent represen-
tationalists have another option: they might accommodate such cases by ac-
cepting color pluralism (Tye and Bradley 2001, Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 16). To 
explain why the tomato looks different to us and to the birds, they might say 
that the tomato objectively possesses the color red and it also objectively pos-
sesses an alien color that we cannot imagine constituted by UV light. We track 
and thereby perceptually represent the red color while the bird tracks and 
thereby perceptually represents the alien color. So there is no color misrepre-
sentation. Byrne and Hilbert (1997, 272-273) and Kalderon (2011) extend plu-
ralism to variation among humans. The color chip viewed by John and Jane is 
both pure blue and slightly greenish blue, where these shades are identical with 
distinct but overlapping ranges of reflectances. John and Jane’s different visual 
systems track and thereby represent these different but equally real properties 
of the chip.12  
Because actual cases do not clearly undermine response-independent rep-
resentationalism, some rely on the conceivability of certain hypothetical “altered 
experience” cases to try to undermine the view. One prominent example is 																																																																																																																																												
er, even if they deny that such truths are a priori deducible from truths about firing rates and the 
line.    
12 There is evidently no formal contradiction in the pluralist view of Byrne and Hilbert (1997) 
that the color chip has one color that is completely bluish and a distinct color that is not com-
pletely bluish but rather a bit greenish as well as bluish. But it is very counterintuitive. For this 
reason, more recently, Byrne and Hilbert (2003) have converted to inegalitarianism about this 
case: they now assert that the chip does not have both shades. So, given response-independent 
representationalism, either John or Jane must be misrepresenting the chip. But now a new prob-
lem arises: since John and Jane are both normal perceivers, it is hard to see what could make it 
the case that one but not the other is guilty of misrepresentation (Cohen 2009). Byrne and Hil-
bert (2007, 90) reply that this is a general problem faced by anyone who accepts that John and 
Jane represent fine-grained colors. But, since Byrne and Hilbert also accept inegalitarianism 
instead of pluralism, they do face an additional question about John and Jane that others (for 
instance, pluralists) do not face, namely: what is the general theory of perceptual representation 
that entails that one of them perceptually represents a reflectance-type that the chip possesses, 
while the other perceptually represents a reflectance-type that it does not possess?  
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David Chalmers. To illustrate, let’s turn back to the example about Suppose 
Maxwell. Maxwell looks at the ball with the middle reflectance shown in Fig-
ure 1. Then it looks bluish to him. Chalmers (2010, 415-416; and 400, n. 7) 
would say that it’s conceivable that there should be another individual – call 
him Twin Maxwell – belonging to another human-like species who bears the 
tracking relation to the very same response-independent reflectance property of 
the ball as Maxwell, but who phenomenally represents a totally different sensible 
color - say, being greenish. If the conceivability of this “altered experience” case 
shows that it is really possible, then of course the phenomenal representation 
relation cannot be identified with a tracking relation, and sensible colors can-
not be identified with reflectance properties.  
In response, response-independent representationalists like Tye (2000, 
109-111) have said that, when it comes to such cases, mere conceivability 
doesn’t establish possibility. According to this response, such altered spectrum 
cases are conceivable, but maybe they are not really possible. Chalmers himself 
concedes (2010, 152) that such conceivability arguments may fail because we 
are ignorant of the true nature of the physical world. So there is reason to 
doubt that the mere conceivability of hypothetical “altered spectrum” cases re-
futes the externalist approach of response-independent representationalism.  
This brings us to a final type of argument against response-independent 
representationalism based on variation in color vision. This argument is simi-
lar to the previous one, except that it relies on research in neuroscience, rather 
than mere conceivability, to argue for the possibility of a certain kind of “al-
tered spectrum” case that is inconsistent with response-independent represen-
tationalism. This argument may succeed where the previous arguments from 
variation fail.  
To illustrate the relevant research in neuroscience, we can use the same 
example that we used to illustrate the structure argument: the example where 
Maxwell consecutively experiences a grape, a ball, and a leaf with the reflec-
tance-types shown in Figure 1. He then experiences purple, blue and green. 
His color experience of the ball resembles his color experience of the grape 
more than his color experience of the leaf. This phenomenological fact cannot 
be explained in terms of the reflectances of those objects tracked by his visual 
system: as we noted before, the reflectance of the ball does not resemble the 
reflectance of the grape more than the reflectance of the leaf. Now here is a 
question that we haven’t looked at yet: what then is the explanation? Recent 
neuroscience supports the hypothesis that the explanation lies in his neural re-
sponses to those reflectances. In particular, Brouwer and Heeger (2009) and 
Bohon et al. (2016) found that, in brain area V4, neural similarity among dis-
tributed patterns of activity predicts phenomenal similarity among color expe-
riences. In fact, if you order these distributed neural patterns by overall simi-
larity, then they form a circle akin to the “color circle”. So we can conjecture 
that the reason why Maxwell’s color experience of the ball resembles his color experi-
ence of the grape more than his color experience of leaf is that his internal V4 neural 
representation of the ball is more like his V4 neural representation of the grape 
than his V4 neural representation of the leaf. The explanation is to be found in-
side, not outside.  
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Now we can use this research to construct a two-step argument for the 
possibility of a hypothetical altered spectrum case that is inconsistent with the 
externalist approach of response-independent representationalism.  
First step. Imagine that Maxwell has a twin, Twin Maxwell, in a hypothet-
ical human-like community that evolved differently than humans. Just like 
Maxwell, Twin Maxwell consecutively experiences a grape, a ball, and a leaf 
with the reflectances shown in Figure 1. Let us suppose that Twin Maxwell’s 
V4 neural representations of the grape and the leaf are identical with Max-
well’s. However, because of naturally evolved differences in this community’s 
postreceptoral wiring, let us suppose that Twin Maxwell’s V4 neural represen-
tation of the middle object only – the ball – differs from Maxwell’s. Specifically, 
while Maxwell’s V4 neural representation of the ball resembles his V4 neural 
representation of the grape more than his V4 neural representation of the leaf, 
in Twin Maxwell the opposite his true: his V4 neural representation of the ball 
resembles his V4 neural representation of the leaf more than his V4 neural 
representation of the grape. As a result, while Maxwell sorts the ball with the 
grape, Twin Maxwell sorts it with the leaf. At the same time, we can suppose 
that Twin Maxwell’s V4 neural representation of the ball, although it is differ-
ent from Maxwell’s V4 neural representation, tracks exactly the same reflec-
tance-type as Maxwell’s V4 neural representation, namely a reflectance-type 
that includes the reflectance shown in the middle in Figure 1. Therefore, on 
viewing the ball, they bear the tracking relation to the very same reflectance-type. 
Analogy: two people, in who belong to different language communities, can 
use different words to track the same type of object.13    
So far, we have only stipulated the physical facts about the case. We have 
left open how Twin Maxwell’s color experiences of the objects compare to 
Maxwell’s. That is the crucial issue.  
Second step. What is the most reasonable view on this issue? Well, when it 
comes to the first and third objects, namely the grape and the leaf, everything 
is physically the same between Maxwell and Twin Maxwell: they respond to 
the reflectances of these objects with the very same neural processing and the 
very same V4 neural states. So, presumably, the grape looks purplish to both, 
and the leaf looks greenish to both. But what about their experience of the ball 
in between? We know that, while Maxwell’s V4 neural representation of the 
ball resembles his V4 neural representation of the purple-looking grape more 
than his V4 neural representation of the green-looking leaf, in Twin Maxwell 
the opposite is true: Twin Maxwell’s V4 neural representation of the ball re-
sembles his V4 neural representation of the green-looking leaf more than his V4 
neural representation of the purple-looking grape. We also know that similari-																																																								
13 Let me clarify this case a bit. As I noted before (see footnote 5), because of metamerism, re-
sponse-independent representationalists identify the blue color of the ball with a general “class” 
or “disjunction” of reflectances. This might be called a “reflectance-type” or “reflectance-class” 
(Byrne and Hilbert 2003, Tye 2000). This reflectance-class includes the reflectance of the ball 
shown in Figure 1 (call this R1) and all the other reflectances (R2, R3, R4) of objects that nor-
mally have the same effect on the visual system and so look the same shade of blue. So, here is a 
more complete description of the case I’m imagining: When Maxwell views the ball, he has a V4 
neural representation that tracks (is normally caused by), and thereby represents, this reflectance-
class (that is, it can be caused by R1 or R2 or R3 or R4). When Twin Maxwell views the ball, his 
V4 neural representation, although different, tracks (is normally caused by) this very same reflec-
tance-class (R1, R2, R3, R4).  
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ty among the reflectances tracked by the color system is a very poor predictor 
of phenomenal similarity and that similarity in V4 neural states is the only 
good predictor of phenomenal similarity. So, the most reasonable view is that, 
on viewing the ball, while Maxwell experiences blue, Twin Maxwell experienc-
es a greenish color. This verdict is also supported by their different sorting dis-
positions.  
But this most reasonable verdict about the case is inconsistent with re-
sponse-independent representationalism. On response-independent represen-
tationalism, they should the very same color experience, because they bear the 
tracking relation to the very same reflectance-type. The neural difference shouldn’t 
make a difference to the character of their experiences, because it doesn’t make 
for a difference in what they track. Since this verdict is not reasonable, we 
must reject response-independent representationalism. Even though they track 
the same response-independent reflectance-type, Maxwell and Twin Maxwell 
experience different sensible colors, contrary to response-independent representa-
tionalism.  
Let us use “internal-dependence” to name the thesis that there are possible 
hypothetical cases in which two individuals have different experiences (and 
hence, given representationalism, phenomenally represent different properties) 
because they have suitably different neural states, even though those neural 
states track exactly the same response-independent properties. In general, the 
present argument has two steps. First, many different lines of research, across 
the sense-modalities, provide overwhelming support for internal-
dependence.14  Second, response-independent representationalism is incom-
patible with internal-dependence. Call this the internal-dependence argument. 15   
Notice that the internal-dependence argument against response-
independent representationalism differs from the structure argument, even if 
we used the same example to illustrate both arguments. The structure argu-
ment was that response-independent representationalism cannot accommodate 
the truth of claims like [#], given the mismatch between our judgments of 
similarity among sensible properties and the similarity relations among the 
corresponding response-independent physical properties. The internal-
dependence argument is different. The internal-dependence argument is that 
response-independent representationalism, as an externalist theory of phe-																																																								
14 For research on color vision supporting internal-dependence, see Brouwer and Heeger (2009), 
Conway (2013), Danilova and Mollon (2016), Forder et al. (2017), and Schmidt et al. (2014). For 
research on audition, taste, smell and pain supporting internal-dependence, see Chang et al. 
(2010), Crouzet et al. (2015), and Howard et al. (2009), and Coghill et al. (1999). For an over-
view, see Kriegeskorte and Kievit (2013). Since internal-dependence is especially well-supported 
for non-visual modalities, it is unlikely that color vision is an exception.  
15 For the internal-dependence argument, see Pautz (1998), (2003) and (2010). For discussion, 
see Allen (2017, pp. 68-73), Cohen (2011, 82-88), Fish (2013, 58-59), and Kalderon (2011, 250-
256). Kalderon (this volume) suggest that Shoemaker (2003, 269) uses a similar argument. But 
Shoemaker’s argument is quite different. In fact, Shoemaker (2003, 269) gives no argument at all 
thinking that the relevant kind of “altered spectrum” case is possible except that we can conceive 
of it (he says “we can imagine” such a case). So he seems to defend the conceivability argument 
discussed above. We saw that this argument is vulnerable to the response “conceivability doesn’t 
entail possibility”. By contrast, the internal-dependence argument relies on empirical research 
across the various modalities to argue that such a case is possible, not mere conceivability. 
Therefore, it is not vulnerable to the response “conceivability doesn’t entail possibility”. 
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nomenal character, cannot accommodate an additional fact: the empirically-
supported role of the brain in shaping the phenomenal character of experience.  
The internal-dependence argument may succeed where other arguments 
from variation fail. It is invulnerable to the “pluralist” response that response-
independent representationalists may use to handle actual cases of variation. 
For, even if the ball has a plurality of chromatic properties, we have stipulated 
that Maxwell and Twin Maxwell track exactly the same one when they see the 
ball. So response-independent representationalism inevitably delivers the mis-
taken verdict that they experience the same sensible color, despite the radical 
neural and behavioral differences between them (Cohen 2009, 86).16 Further, 
the internal-dependence argument is invulnerable to the “mere conceivability 
doesn’t entail possibility” response that can be used to answer David 
Chalmers’s argument against response-independent representationalism. In 
fact, the internal-dependence argument doesn’t rely on conceivability at all to 
establish the possibility of individuals experiencing different sensible colors 
while tracking the same response-independent properties. Instead, it provides 
a two-step empirical argument for this possibility.17   
Given internal-dependence, internal neural responses play a big role in de-
termining what sensible colors we perceptually represent in external space. 
This brings us to response-dependent representationalism.  
 
3. Response-Dependent Representationalism 
 
I will introduce response-dependent representationalism by way of explaining how 
it might accommodate “internal-dependence”. Recall that, given internal de-
pendence, Maxwell and Twin Maxwell track the same reflectance property of 
the ball, but nevertheless perceptually represent it as having different sensible 
colors, namely being bluish and being greenish, due to their differing internal 
neural states.  
																																																								
16 For the same reason, the response-independent representationalist cannot in this case use the 
inegalitarian response that Maxwell or Twin Maxwell is misrepresenting the color of the ball, 
contrary to Byrne and Tye (2006, 253). For this point, see Cohen (2009, 86).  
17 There is another important problem for response-independent representationalism quite dif-
ferent from the empirical problems I have focused on. In particular, Chalmers (2010, 354-355) 
suggests that this view faces a problem about experiential indeterminacy. Here is an especially 
difficult case (not considered by Chalmers). Consider the well-known “inverted earth case”. (For 
details, see for instance Lycan 2001, 30-31.) But let’s add a twist. To begin with, suppose that 
there is an Earthian male whose neural representation S of the sky has the biological function of 
tracking blue, and an inverted Earthian female whose neural representation S of the sky instead 
has the biological function of tracking yellow. Strictly speaking, they belong to different species, 
which evolved on the different planets independently. However, let us suppose that, by an out-
standing coincidence, they are genetically nearly identical (except for their different color vi-
sion), so that they can interbreed and have a child. Now here is the problem: on response-
independent representationalism, it will presumably be indeterminate whether the child’s neural 
representation of the sky, S, represents yellow or blue, since it is indeterminate whether in this 
creature S has the historical, biological function of tracking yellow or blue (for we may suppose that 
there is nothing that could settle whether the child belongs to one parent’s species rather than 
the other’s). If so, it will indeterminate whether it has a yellowish or bluish color experience. But 
it is deeply counterintuitive that color phenomenology could be radically indeterminate in this 
way.  
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In one version, the proposal of response-dependent representationalists is 
that the different sensible colors that Maxwell and Twin Maxwell perceptually 
represent are identical with the different dispositions of the ball to cause their 
differing internal neural states (call them “N1” and “N2”).18 So, the bluish sen-
sible color that Maxwell experiences is identical with a response-dependent 
property of the ball along the lines of: normally causing neural state N1 in mem-
bers of one’s kind. (Or maybe normally causing N1 in members of some kind or oth-
er.) By contrast, the greenish sensible color that Twin Maxwell perceptually 
represents is identical with a different such property: normally causing neural 
state N2 in members of one’s kind. On this view, the visual system is narcissistic: 
it represents how objects affect the visual system.  
So response-dependent representationalism shows more promise in ac-
commodating internal-dependence than response-independent representa-
tionalism. Unlike response-independent representationalism, it may also be 
able to accommodate our “structure judgments”. On this view, judgments 
about the resemblances among sensible colors are not about response-
independent reflectances properties of objects like those in Figure 1, as on re-
sponse-independent representationalism. Rather, they are judgments about 
response-dependent properties of objects of the form normally causing neural 
response N. Now, such response-dependent properties resemble insofar as the 
responses in terms of which they are defined resemble (Johnston 1992, 240). 
So if, as empirical research seems to indicate (Brouwer and Heeger 2009), the 
resemblances among our internal neural states in the color vision system 
match our judgments of resemblances among sensible colors, then those 
judgments come out true. Response-independent representationalists can gen-
eralize the same account to our judgments of resemblances among other sensi-
ble properties, such as judgments about the resemblances among smells con-
sidered in the previous section. 
However, response-dependent representationalism faces problems of its 
own. We will focus on two.  
First, response-dependent representationalists have focused almost exclu-
sively on what I have called the “sensible colors question”. But what is their 
answer to the “representation relation question” about how we represent sensi-
ble colors?   
As noted in §2, it is natural to use a broadly “tracking” model to explain 
how we can perceptually represent spatial properties, and considerations of 
uniformity suggest generalizing this account of the perceptual representation 
of sensible colors. But response-dependent representationalists cannot accept a 
tracking model for the perceptual representation of sensible colors.  																																																								
18 This might be called “the neural response version” of response-dependent representational-
ism. Harman (1996, 10) and Kriegel (2009, 90) are proponents. Shoemaker (1994) defends a 
different version, on which the relevant responses are color experiences. But it faces a serious cir-
cularity problem that is avoided by the neural response version. For discussion of this point, see 
Harman (1996, 10), Kriegel (2009, 88) and Levine (forthcoming). For these reasons, I will focus 
on the superior “neural response” version, which avoids the circularity problem. Fregean repre-
sentationalism about color experience (Chalmers 2010, essay 11) is very similar to response-
dependent representationalism. It holds that one has a bluish experience iff one has an experi-
ence that represents that something has the property having the unique property that normally 
causes bluish experiences. I will not discuss it separately here.  
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To see this, return to the case of Maxwell and Twin Maxwell. On re-
sponse-dependent representationalism, they perceptually represent the ball as 
having different sensible colors, identified with relational properties of the 
form normally causing so-and-so neural state. But they do not in any sense track 
these different complex, relational properties. For instance, Maxwell’s internal 
neural state N1 is not caused, under biological normal conditions, by the in-
stantiation by the ball of the relational property: normally causing that very neu-
ral state, N1, in Maxwell’s population. For the property of normally causing N1 
isn’t itself casually efficacious in causing N1. Our visual systems are not causal-
ly sensitive to such properties. Furthermore, N1 arguably doesn’t have the bio-
logical function of tracking this specific ecologically insignificant relational 
property. Similar remarks apply to Twin Maxwell. On the contrary, Maxwell 
and Twin Maxwell’s different internal neural states are caused by, and have the 
function of tracking, the same reflectance property of the ball (Cohen 2009, 86), 
since the color system is geared to recovering surface reflectances. Since re-
sponse-dependent representationalists claim that they perceptually represent dif-
ferent response-dependent properties, it follows that they cannot identify the 
perceptual representation relation with a standard tracking relation.  
But if Maxwell and Twin Maxwell’s visual systems do not have the func-
tion of tracking the relevant response-dependent properties of the ball, then 
what is the alternative account of how they perceptually represent them? Syd-
ney Shoemaker, a prominent defender of this approach, candidly admits, “I 
have no fully satisfactory answer” (1994, 37). Call this the representational prob-
lem. 
The problem is made more difficult by the fact that the ball has multiple 
response-dependent properties of this sort involving different subjects, differ-
ent responses, and different conditions: for instance, it normally causes certain 
V4 neural responses in Maxwell under certain conditions, it normally causes certain 
V4 neural responses in Twin Maxwell under certain conditions, it normally causes 
certain retinal activity in Maxwell, and so on. What makes it the case that Max-
well perceptually represents one specific response-independent property on this 
list, and Twin Maxwell perceptually represents another? What makes it the 
case that certain specific response-dependent properties are visually represent to 
them?  
In fact, the problem is even more difficult than this. For, in addition to 
perceptually representing sensible colors, we of course perceptually represent 
spatial properties, such as shapes, positions, and distances. These spatial proper-
ties are evidently not response-dependent properties of the form: normally caus-
ing neural response X. So, response-dependent representationalists must answer 
the following question: what is the single, uniform reductive theory of the per-
ceptual representation relation that implies that in some cases we perceptually 
represent funny response-dependent properties of the form normally causing neu-
ral response X in individuals with color system S (or whatever response-dependent 
with which they identify the sensible colors), while in other cases we perceptu-
ally represent response-independent spatial properties of a radically different 
sort? It would be implausible to answer by saying that the shape-system has the 
function of indicating response-independent shape properties, while the color-
system has the sole function of indicating these entirely different, funny re-
sponse-dependent properties (rather than, say, the function of indicating re-
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sponse-independent reflectance properties, or simply the function of guiding 
our behavior in a useful way). Since the notion of “the function” of a system is 
unclear, it is just not at all obvious what could this mean and what could make 
it the case.19  
There is a second, much simpler problem for response-dependent repre-
sentationalism. Briefly, on this view, sensible colors are relations to types of 
neural states and types of perceivers. But this doesn’t fit the phenomenology. 
Sensible colors just don’t look like relations. They seem non-relational. In-
deed, they seem “simple”. Call this the phenomenological problem.20  
So far, we have looked at one version of response-dependent representa-
tionalism. But it is not the only version. Colin McGinn (1996) has devised a 
complicated novel version that is designed to avoid the phenomenological 
problem. As a bonus, it suggests an answer to the representational problem. 
Let me explain.   
The version of response-dependent representationalism we have so far 
considered is reductive: it identifies sensible colors with response-dependent, 
physical properties of objects (see note 8). McGinn (1999) defends a form of 
representationalism. But, against reductive representationalism, he insists 
(1996, 541-542) that, “when we see an object as red we see it as having a simple, 
monadic, local property of the object's surface”, distinct from any complex 
physical property. He is a non-reductive representationalist.  
Even though he thinks colors are simple, non-relational properties of ob-
jects, McGinn also holds that it is just a brute “law of metaphysics” that their 
instantiation by objects is tied to those objects’ effects on perceivers. This is 
what makes his view qualify as response-dependent. In particular, he postulates 
the following general principle: it is metaphysically necessary that an object 
has a simple sensible color C if and only if, and because, it normally causes the 																																																								
19 For presentations of this “representational problem” for the response-dependent representa-
tionalism, see Pautz (2010, 350-355), and Byrne and Hilbert (forthcoming). For a response, see 
section 3.5 of Jonathan Cohen’s contribution to this volume. Cohen’s response is that we cer-
tainly can represent in thought and language fine-grained response-dependent properties. For 
instance, I can say “consider a property of the form causing neural state, N1, in Maxwell’s popula-
tion under precise viewing circumstances C1”, and thereby refer to a property of this kind. Cohen 
then suggests, “if so, then it’s open to [response-dependent representationalists] to hold that 
whatever accounts for the mental representation of such properties [in thought and language] can 
also serve as an account of how states of the visual system represent the very same properties”. 
But this is mistaken. The correct account of my ability refer to such a fine-grained response-
dependent property in thought is that I speak a language with a compositional semantics, and this 
language has symbols like “neural state”, “Maxwell’s population”, “precise viewing circumstanc-
es”. So I can form a complex predicate out of these terms in order to represent to a fine-grained 
response-dependent property. Contrary to Cohen, the same compositional, language-based 
account definitely cannot serve to explain the perceptual representation of these properties, for a 
very simple and decisive reason: the format of perceptual representation is not language-like but 
rather iconic (Tye 1995). Even setting this point aside, the suggestion is incredible. What evolu-
tionary advantage would come from the visual system being innately equipped with symbols like 
“neural state”, “my population”, “precise viewing circumstances C1”, and forming, whenever 
enjoys a color experience, a complex representation along the lines of “there is an object out 
there that causes neural state, N1, in my population under precise viewing circumstances C1”. 
There are other problems with Cohen’s response. For instance, he doesn’t address the “uni-
formity problem” mentioned in the text (see also Pautz 2010, 353).  
20 For this problem, see Armstrong (1984, 170), Boghossian and Velleman (1989) and McGinn 
(1996). One response depends on the “neutrality thesis”. For discussion, see McGinn (1999).  
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experience of that very sensible color, C, in some normal perceivers under 
some normal conditions. Call this [Bicon], because it is bi-conditional claim.  
Let’s take an example. The ball in our example above has the property: 
normally causing experiences of the property of being blue in normal humans (like 
Maxwell) under normal conditions. By [Bicon], the fact that the ball has this rela-
tional property grounds the fact that it actually instantiates the property being 
blue. Nevertheless, according to McGinn, being blue is a “simple”, non-
relational property of the ball that is distinct from this relational property that 
always grounds it. So McGinn thinks that [Bicon] doesn’t amount to a reduc-
tion of being blue. Likewise, because the ball is also disposed to normally look 
greenish to normal twin humans (like Twin Maxwell), it also instantiates the 
simple property being greenish, according to [Bicon]. In general, thanks to [Bi-
con], objects are guaranteed to really possess exactly those simple colors that 
they normally appear to possess.  
McGinn’s view provides a unique origin story for color. Given [Bicon], be-
fore sentient creatures evolved, objects had no sensible colors, for the simple 
reason that they did not habitually look to have any colors to any individuals. 
Then brains evolved that have an intrinsic capacity to enable us to perceptually 
represent objects as having certain simple sensible colors. That is, brains 
evolved that in this sense “project” simple colors into objects. Thanks to [Bi-
con], those objects thereby acquired those (and only those) simple sensible col-
ors, in addition to their scientific properties. In other words, [Bicon] guaran-
tees a fortunate match between appearance and reality when it comes to sensi-
ble colors.  
McGinn’s non-reductive response-dependent view avoids the two prob-
lems with the reductive version considered above. First and most obviously, it 
avoids the “phenomenological problem” facing the reductive version. For, on 
McGinn’s non-reductive version, sensible colors themselves are simple, non-
relational properties of objects just as they appear to be, even if by [Bicon] they 
are grounded in distinct complex, relational properties of those objects.  
As we saw, the reductive response-dependent theorist also faces a “repre-
sentational problem”. McGinn faces a question here too: how do we manage 
to perceptually represent these alleged “simple” sensible colors? McGinn also 
cannot identify the perceptual representation between subjects and sensible 
colors with the externally-determined “tracking relation”, for a couple of rea-
sons. This goes against internal-dependence. And it requires that sensible col-
ors are “out there” prior to our representation of them, which goes against 
[Bicon].  
However, McGinn’s view suggests an alternative answer to the “represen-
tational problem”. Because he is already an anti-reductionist about sensible 
colors, he might provide a parallel non-reductive account of our ability to per-
ceptually represent those sensible colors. In particular, he might say that this 
relation is irreducible, just as he thinks sensible colors are. That is, there is no 
true identity of the form: the perceptual representation relation = complex 
physical relation R. (Compare: it is implausible that there is a general reduction 
of the reference relation in physical terms, given that we can refer to such di-
verse things as chairs, numbers, and uninstantiated kinds.) Nevertheless, he 
might say that, whenever one bears this relation to some sensible colors, this is 
grounded in one’s total internal neural state. Indeed, maybe it is possible in 
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principle to systematically “decode” what sensible colors an individual percep-
tually represents from her V4 neural patterns (Brouwer and Heeger 2009, 
Haynes 2009, Bohon et al. 2016). This yields a non-reductive and internalist 
form of representationalism (Chalmers 2010, Horgan 2015). It might be com-
bined with non-reductive physicalism: experiential facts are grounded in physi-
cal facts, even if a general reduction is impossible.  
It is worth noting another virtue of McGinn’s view: it nicely avoids the 
structural-mismatch problem that we brought against response-independent 
representationalism (§2). On his view, the sensible colors that we perceptually 
represent are simple properties, which are quite distinct from the types of re-
flectances shown in Figure 1. So McGinn is free to say that these simple prop-
erties generally stand in exactly the resemblance relations they seem to stand 
in, even if the corresponding reflectances-types do not. For instance, he might 
say that, when Maxwell says “this shade of blue resembles this shade of purple 
more than that shade of green”, he is correctly reporting that the shades stand 
in a unique unanalyzable relation of intrinsic qualitative resemblance (see e. g. 
Allen 2017, 124-125). Since this relation is very “natural” (in the sense of Lew-
is 1983), McGinn’s view also accommodates the point (illustrated in §2 with 
the story about Larry on a remote island) that, once we experience a finite 
number of resembling qualities, we can easily determinately grasp this general 
relation. Then we can apply it to new qualities, and thereby make true or false 
claims.  
McGinn’s view also avoids a general problem that Chalmers (2010, 400) 
raises for all realist views of color. Chalmers suggests that realists are led to 
chromatic explosion. Let’s go back to the ball with the reflectance shown in Fig-
ure 1. It normally looks one color to Maxwell. It could have looked another 
color to “Twin Maxwell”. Indeed, Chalmers holds that, for any color you 
choose, the ball could normally look that color to a possible perceiver. So, to 
avoid favoritism or arbitrariness, musn’t realists say that, right now, the ball 
has all of those colors? McGinn’s view – which Chalmers doesn’t consider – 
avoids this radical chromatic explosion. Given his [Bicon] principle, the ball 
possesses only those simple colors it appears to have to some actual normal per-
ceiver under some normal conditions. In general, an object only has enough 
colors to make the experiences of actual perceivers generally veridical, and not 
more. This is a limited color pluralism.   
While McGinn’s view avoids some problems, it also faces a few new ones. 
Here I will mention two.  
First, the case for [Bicon] is unclear. It is not a priori. This is shown by the 
fact that the irrealist representationalist view to be considered in the next sec-
tion rejects [Bicon], but it cannot be ruled out a priori (Tye 2000,  170). The 
only argument for [Bicon] seems to be that it allows McGinn to agree with our 
pre-theoretical conviction that objects have the sensible colors they appear to 
have. But our pre-theoretical convictions have a bad track-record.  
Second, simplicity considerations count against [Bicon]. It reports a neces-
sary connection between two highly disparate sorts of properties, namely, sim-
ple, occurrent sensible colors and complex dispositions of objects to appear to have 
those sensible colors. It is not derivable from logic or from any general modal 
principles. It would have to be accepted as an additional, brute principle – a 
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special brute “law of metaphysics” (Rosen 2009, 133), or a “grounding dan-
gler”. 
Third, [Bicon] faces a problem about borderline cases. As Hardin (1988) 
has emphasized, lighting conditions can radically influence color appearance 
but there is no precise cutoff between normal and abnormal lighting condi-
tions. Now suppose that you view a color chip in lighting conditions C, where 
this is a borderline case of normal conditions. On McGinn’s view, there is a spe-
cific simple shade that you determinately perceptually represent, which is 
somewhat different from the apparent shade of the chip in perfect daylight. 
Suppose you dub it “blue31”. Now, by [Bicon], the chip really instantiates 
blue31 iff it looks blue31 under normal conditions. Since in this case the right-
hand side is indeterminate (since C is a borderline case of “normal conditions”), 
it follows from [Bicon] that the left-hand is indeterminate too. That is, there is 
this specific shade, blue31, such that it is indeterminate whether the chip instan-
tiates it. Hence [Bicon] requires “vagueness in the world”, which many consid-
er to be incoherent (Lewis 1993). 
 
4. Irrealist Representationalism  
 
Irrealism holds that ordinary physical objects don’t instantiate sensible colors. 
All that is out there are particles and waves and fields. It became very popular 
after the scientific revolution of the 17th century and was defended by Galileo, 
Newton, Descartes, and Locke. Hardin (1987) and Chalmers (2010) describe 
the rejection of realism in dramatic terms: they call it a “fall from Eden”. 
Traditionally, irrealists have said that, although sensible colors do not 
qualify ordinary physical objects, they do qualify something. For instance, if you 
look at a tomato, the reddish quality is instantiated by a round item you experi-
ence (called an “idea”, a “sense datum”, or a “visual field region”) located in a 
kind of private mental arena created by your brain (Boghossian and Velleman 
1989). On this view, you only ever experience such very life-like mental imag-
es, which you mistakenly believe to be physical objects. But, as I noted at the 
outset, such “sense data” create serious puzzles.  
Representationalism has made possible a new and more defensible form of 
irrealism. Irrealist representationalism holds that, when you view a tomato, you 
perceptually represent the property being reddish as co-instantiated with the prop-
erty being round. So it seems that these properties are instantiated together be-
fore you. But, in fact, the property of being reddish is not instantiated by any-
thing. It is not instantiated by a physical round thing before you; and it is also 
not instantiated by a mental round thing – there is no such thing. There is no 
reddish thing there of any kind, even though there seems to be one. So the 
property being reddish is a bit like the property being a unicorn: it is an entirely 
uninstantiated property. When it comes to sensible colors at least, the brain is 
a kind of “partial virtual reality machine”, which projects onto objects some 
features that they don’t really have.21  
In some respects, irrealist representationalism resembles McGinn’s view 
considered above. It shares with McGinn’s view the following two claims. 																																																								
21 Recent proponents of irrealist representationalism, or something close to it, include Chalmers 
2010, Mackie 1976, Maund 1995, Pautz 2006, and Wright 2003.  
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First, we perceptually represent objects as having simple color properties, 
which cannot be identified with reflectances or the like. Second, the brain has 
an intrinsic and innate capacity to enable us to perceptually represent these 
properties, without any contribution from the world. The difference is this: 
McGinn wants to accept the commonsense view that objects normally have the 
very simple color properties that the brain projects onto those objects, so he 
posits a brute principle, [Bicon], that guarantees this result. By contrast, irreal-
ists reject [Bicon]. They deny that objects really have the simple color proper-
ties that the brain projects.   
What is the argument for irrealist representationalism? In his influential 
paper, “Perception and the Fall from Eden”, David Chalmers provides a most-
ly a priori defense of this view. As we saw (§2), he uses the conceivability of “al-
tered spectrum cases” to rule out the view of response-independent represen-
tationalists that sensible colors are identical with reflectance properties. More 
generally, he argues that sensible colors cannot be identical with any physical 
properties, because there is an intuitive “epistemic gap” between sensible col-
ors and all physical properties (2010, 399, 415). So, Chalmers concludes, sen-
sible colors must be simple, irreducible properties. Then, as we noted before 
(§3), Chalmers argues that, to avoid arbitrariness, realists would need to accept 
the conclusion of “chromatic explosion”: every object has every simple color 
(p. 400)! (Allen (2017, 71-72 apparently defends this view.) Chalmers says that 
“this conclusion is even more counterintuitive than the [irrealist] conclusion 
that all color experiences are illusory”. So, he opts for irrealism.  
But this complex a priori rationale for irrealism faces problems. First of all, 
as we already noted, Chalmers’s conceivability argument against externalist 
approaches like response-independent representationalism is open to the 
standard criticism that “conceivability doesn’t establish possibility”. In other 
words, response-independent representationalists might agree that “altered 
spectrum cases” like the case of Maxwell and Twin Maxwell are conceivable, but 
then just deny that they possible. Second, even if representationalists accept 
the possibility of such cases, realism doesn’t require “chromatic explosion”. As 
we saw, McGinn’s form of realism, which Chalmers does not consider, puts 
the brakes on chromatic explosion, and yet it is liberal enough to accommo-
date the veridicality of our actual color experiences in normal conditions.   
However, there is also a more empirical argument for irrealist representa-
tionalism. This argument has two stages. First stage: representationalists can 
rule out reductive theories of sensible colors on the basis of empirical argu-
ments, without having to rely on Chalmers’s a priori considerations. In particu-
lar, sensible colors cannot be identified response-independent reflectance prop-
erties of objects. For this view is undermined by the structural-mismatch argu-
ment and the internal-dependence argument (§2). Sensible colors also cannot 
be identified with response-dependent properties of objects of the form: nor-
mally causing neural response N in community C. This view is undermined by the 
representational problem and the phenomenological problem (§3). So if repre-
sentationalists want to be realists about sensible color, then their only option is 
to accept a view like McGinn’s on which objects have simple sensible properties 
over and above their physical properties. Second stage: this type of view can now 
be argued against on the basis of simplicity considerations (§3). McGinn’s view 
requires the [Bicon] principle, which posits a massive unexplained coincidence. 
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In particular, [Bicon] is the conjecture that, if we evolved so that our brain 
projects certain simple sensible colors onto objects, then viola those objects 
thereby acquire those very simple sensible colors. But why should nature be so 
obliging? There is no overwhelming a priori or empirical reason to accept this 
principle. Of course, it could be true. But irrealist representationalist will say 
that we are obliged to reject it for the same reason we are obliged to reject 
other needlessly complicated empirical theories.  
Another consideration in favor of irrealist representationalism about color 
experience over the realist forms of representationalism is this. There are es-
pecially strong empirical and a priori reasons to think various qualities we feel 
in bodily regions (pain qualities, “pins and needles”, etc.) cannot be identified 
with any real, mind-independent physical properties of those bodily regions. 
There are also especially strong empirical reasons to think that smell proper-
ties (discussed in §2) as well as audible properties (e. g. phoneme-types) cannot 
be identified with real physical properties of external items. These are all “pro-
jected” qualities. Why should we continue to insist that sensible colors are an 
exception? Why insist that they are really possessed by external items, if these 
other sensible properties are not (Locke 1869, II.viii.16)? 22 
Finally, there is an evolutionary argument for taking irrealist representa-
tionalism seriously. The primary function of the sensory systems is to enhance 
adaptive fitness - not to represent the way the world really is. There is every 
reason to expect that this should sometimes involve embellishment or error, 
depending on an individual’s unique ecology. For instance, even if fruits are 
not intrinsically bright or sweet, it is understandable that we evolved to experi-
ence them as bright and sweet.    
Irrealism in some form or another is the dominant view among color sci-
entists. For instance, Cosmides and Tooby (1995, xi) maintain that “color is an 
invention that specialized circuitry computes and then projects onto physically 
colorless objects”.  
While irrealism is a popular view among color scientists, it is typically con-
sidered to be an outlandish “position of last resort” among philosophers. 
There is a curious disconnect between philosophy and science. Let us consider 
some of the philosophical objections to irrealist representationalism, together 
with possible replies.  
Objection. The irrealist representationalist holds that, when you see a toma-
to, then redness is in some sense ostensibly present to you, and this is bound up 
with the character of your experience, even though it is not instantiated in the 
world or in your experience. But this is difficult to understand.23  
Reply. To see that this is not an objection, consider a different example. 
Suppose you have the condition known as “Charles Bonnet syndrome which 
involves vivid hallucinations. You hallucinate an object with a very unusual 																																																								
22 For a host of empirical and a priori reasons for denying that pain qualities and other sensible 
properties aren’t instantiated in the extracranial world, see Pautz 2010 and Levine forthcoming. 
For instance, in the domain of speech perception, it often happens that a categorical change in 
the perceived sensible property (e. g. from /da/ to /ta/) corresponds to no categorical change in 
the objective stimulus. It is impossible to be a realist about audible qualities; they are projections 
of the brain.  
23 For this objection, see Campbell (this volume), Levine (forthcoming), and Papineau (2016, 
sect. 13). 
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shape. In this case, everyone should admit that, necessarily, in having this ex-
perience, you in some sense ostensibly presented with an unusual shape property, 
and this is bound up with the character of your experience, even if this proper-
ty is not instantiated in your environment or in your experience (setting aside 
exotic objects like “sense data”). This explains why everyone recognizes a sense 
in which your experience is non-veridical. It also explains how your experience 
gives you the ability to refer to this unusual shape property (a shape property 
you might have not recently encountered in real life). If this kind of delusory 
presentation of an uninstantiated property can happen with respect to shape, 
why can’t it happen with respect to color?  
Objection. But how could such color illusions always happen? How could 
the brain enable us to perceptually represent properties of a wholly novel sort 
that have never been instantiated in the world? Our standard models for ex-
plaining how we represent properties appeal to tracking real instances of those 
properties in the world, but irrealists cannot accept this view. In short, irreal-
ism requires a total mystery when it comes to the “representation relation 
question” (Tye 2000, 166). 
Reply. Irrealist representationalists can make a few points in reply. First, we 
already know from internal-dependence that tracking theories fail in the spe-
cial case of perceptual representation. For instance, Maxwell and Twin Max-
well experience different sensible colors but track the same reflectance proper-
ties. In view of this, the best view of perceptual representation may be the in-
ternalist, non-reductive view we considered in connection with McGinn’s ap-
proach. And that view is consistent with irrealism. On this internalist view, the 
brain has an intrinsic capacity to represent sensible colors and other sensible 
properties, whether or not they are instantiated in the world.24   
Second, we already know, independently of the color debate, that the brain 
is “creative”: it is not limited to representing what is there. For instance, it can 
represent uninstantiated kinds and abstract objects (Chalmers 2010, 417). So 
why not uninstantiated sensible colors?25  
Third, the claim of irrealist representationalists that the brain has an in-
trinsic capacity to represent unreal sensible properties may look mysterious 																																																								
24 A clarification: Even if irrealists must hold that the brain alone explains our ability to perceptu-
ally represent colors, they needn’t say that it explains the existence and character of the colors them-
selves. Instead, they might accept a “transcendent” view of color properties on which they exist 
necessarily and their character is entirely mind-independent (Russell 1912, chap. IX). Compare: 
the brain doesn’t create numbers or the facts about numbers; it only grounds our capacity to 
represent numbers.  
25 Indeed, on irrealist representationalism, the central puzzle about experience becomes: how can 
we perceptually represent uninstantiated sensible properties? To illustrate, consider Frank Jackson’s 
knowledge argument. In her black and white room, Mary learns all the truths about the instanti-
ation of fundamental physical properties in our world. On irrealist representationalism, when 
she is released, she learns certain truths about non-physical sensible colors, for instance, that 
there exist these specific qualities, with specific natures or quiddities. But since these properties 
are uninstantiated, they are not themselves a problem for the physicalist claim that all instantiat-
ed properties are grounded in physical properties (Jackson 2004, 431). (Compare: physicalists 
can believe that there exists the non-physical property being a unicorn, and that we are related to 
it in thought, as long as they say that it is uninstantiated.) So if we accept irrealist representa-
tionalism, then we should say that the “sensible properties question” is not the real problem for 
physicalism. Rather, it is the “representation relation question”: how can the brain enable us to 
perceptually represent these peculiar, uninstantiated non-physical properties? 
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only because we do not know enough about the brain. Maybe, if we had a 
more systematic understanding of the “neural code”, we would understand 
why one neural state is the basis of representing the color red, while another is 
the basis of representing the color orange (Brouwer and Heeger 2009, Haynes 
2009, Bohon et al. 2016). 
Objection. Suppose you view a tomato. Then you have a neural representa-
tion of sensible redness “bound” in the brain with a neural representation of 
roundness. We just saw that irrealists must accept an internalist theory of how 
we perceptually represent sensible redness. But previously (§2) we saw that it is 
very natural to accept an externalist, tracking theory of how we perceptually 
represent shape. So irrealist representationalists require a non-uniform theory 
of perceptual representation. Since the perceptual representation of shape is 
inextricably bound up with the perceptual representation of sensible color, 
such a non-uniform theory is untenable: if the perceptual representation of 
sensible color is internally-determined, so too must be the perceptual repre-
sentation of shape.  
Reply. In fact, irrealist representationalists are not committed to a non-
uniform theory of perceptual representation. Chalmers (2010, 443) and Hor-
gan (2015) have argued the perceptual representation of spatio-temporal prop-
erties is internally-determined, just like the perceptual representation of sensi-
ble colors. In fact, one might go further and argue that perceived spatial-
temporal relations are no more “out there” than sensible colors. For instance, 
it seems obvious that the spatial-temporal relations we phenomenally represent 
are not frame-relative, but relativity theory shows that no such relations are 
out there.26 
Objection. Irrealist representationalism requires an implausible across-the-
board error theory about all of our talk of colors.  
Reply. In fact, irrealist representationalism does not require this. Recall 
Maxwell viewing the grape, the ball, and the leaf. He judges “the blue color 
resembles the purple color more than the green color”. Remember that re-
sponse-independent representationalists have trouble accommodating the 
truth of this judgment (see Figure 1). By contrast, irrealists can hold that this is 
a perfectly true judgment about the relevant sensible colors, even though they 
are not instantiated. Compare: there can be truths about resemblances among 
complex shapes, even if they are not instantiated. Maxwell also judges “the 
grape is purple, the ball is blue, and the leaf is green”. Irrealists can say that he 
thereby expresses or implicates a truth about how these things habitually look 
(Boghossian and Velleman 1989; for a somewhat different conciliatory ap-




One general moral to draw from the preceding overview is that representa-
tionalism about color experience is a very flexible doctrine. It is compatible 																																																								
26 For discussion of the idea that relativity theory and quantum mechanics support irrealism 
about the spatio-temporal properties we perceptually represent (perceived simultaneity, per-
ceived three-dimensional shape), see Chalmers (2012, 296-297, 333), Boghossian (2011, 56), and 
Ney (2013, 177-181). 
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with just about every major view on the metaphysics of sensible colors.27 The 
hope of representationalists is that their view can simultaneously accommodate 
two facts: (i) the phenomenological fact that we ostensibly experience sensible 
colors “out there” along with shapes and locations, and (ii) the empirical fact 
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